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Abstract 
This paper attempts to unravel elements of the problem of communicating security to citizens in the EU 
and to show how it is tangled up in the misleading dichotomous rhetoric of security or liberty. The 
resulting failure of public diplomacy leads to sub-optimal policy outcomes and accountability deficits. 
The paper i) explores these effects in the context of problems of communication in spaces of 
disconnection arising between political agents of territorial power and the creation and maintenance of 
citizens' affective loyalties; ii) briefly examines issues arising from the introduction of biometric 
identifiers to show how liberty and security are portrayed as alternative rather than complementary 
options; and iii) relates this portrayal to aspects of managing communication. It concludes that 
imprecision among elites as to what they mean by 'security' and what they think they communicate 
aggravates accountability deficits, public trust and confidence in the EU.   
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COMMUNICATING (IN)SECURITY: 
A FAILURE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY? 
JULIET LODGE 
Introduction 
Some 17% of all European Commission legislative proposals relate to freedom, security and 
justice. Somewhat surprisingly, in confronting the need to balance liberty with security, 
inadequate attention has been paid to the need to communicate the purposes of security 
convincingly to citizens. Instead, there is a failure of public diplomacy that mirrors but is 
exacerbated by the public diplomacy failure in respect to communicating Europe. 
This paper attempts to unravel elements of the problem of communicating security to citizens in 
the EU and shows how it is tangled up in the misleading dichotomous rhetoric of security or 
liberty. The resulting failure of public diplomacy leads to sub-optimal policy outcomes and 
accountability deficits, which appear to upset the balance between implementing security 
measures while sustaining liberty in the EU setting. First, this paper begins by placing this issue 
within the context of disconnection between the political agents of territorial power and 
citizens’ affective loyalties. Second, it illustrates how liberty and security are portrayed as 
alternative rather than complementary options by briefly examining aspects of the introduction 
of biometric identifiers. Third, it relates this portrayal to managing communication. It concludes 
that imprecision among elites as to what they mean to communicate as well as over what they 
think they communicate undermines public trust and confidence in the EU. 
1.   Problems of communication in spaces of disconnection 
Political communication is varied in scope and intent, but it is an essential element of public 
diplomacy. Public diplomacy concerns the communication of political messages by the 
governing political authorities to the public. The content of the message is subject to several 
determinants beyond those associated with political context, time, degree of crisis and 
organisational politics. These include the size of the target audience, the nature of political 
leadership, politico-legal constraints,
1  organisational and communication cultures, framing 
structures, intervening mediation and brokering between political agencies and the 
communication establishments.
2 The EU’s claim that it is ‘listening’ implies feedback from the 
public in response to its public diplomacy initiatives in communicating Europe (and its policy 
goals). These issues are outside the scope of this paper. Instead, we focus on problems resulting 
in a lack of clarity and leadership in the communication of messages and claims about 
‘security’, and specifically sustaining freedom, security and justice in the EU. That the EU 
                                                      
1 See on leadership problems in general: OECD (2003), Challenges for E-government Development, 5th Global 
Forum on Reinventing Government, Mexico City, 5 November (retrieved from 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan012241.pdf); United Nations (2003), World Public 
Sector Report: E-government at the Crossroads, New York, United Nations, (retrieved from 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan012733.pdf). 
2 B. Bimber (2000), “The Study of Information Technology and Civic Engagement”, Political Communication, Vol. 
17, No. 4, pp. 329-33; S. Albrecht (2006), “Whose voice is heard in online deliberation?: A study of participation and 
representation in political events on the internet”, Information, Communication and Society, Vol. 9, No. 1, February, 
pp. 62-82.; J. Hands, (2006), “Civil Society, cosmopolitics and the net: The legacy of 15 February 2003”, 
Information, Communication & Society, Vol 9, No. 2, April, pp. 225-243. 2 | JULIET LODGE 
 
Commission has identified a need to ‘communicate Europe’ to the public marks a recognition of 
a communication gap as well as low public interest in or attachment to the EU. The EU 
Commission’s ‘Plan D’ aims to reconnect the citizen with the EU by enhancing democracy, 
dialogue and debate and prepare the citizen for e-governance 2020 when it is assumed that ICT 
(information and communications technology) will have a far greater direct impact and 
tangibility for citizens in their everyday experience of the government services.
3 The EU and 
member states cannot afford to allow the accountability deficit + digi-divide + digi-exclusion + 
unconvincing muddled claims on e-security to exacerbate a trust deficit in ways that aggravate a 
sense of distance and disconnection and fail to bring the citizen closer to the Union.  
1.1. Disconnection,  deficits and affective loyalties 
Theories variously explain citizen disconnectedness from their territorial governments in terms 
of globalisation theories, centreless societies, social movements and interconnected 
cosmopolitan networks.
4 Yet in the EU, power and authority continue to be regulated through 
territorially-based institutions seen to be imbued with values that are supposed to illustrate 
continuity with past traditions of liberal democracy and exemplify common aspirational values 
that transcend member state boundaries. While they may not be universal or reflect a single 
understanding of those values, they broadly reflect acceptance or passive acquiescence over 
society and how through the exercise of authority the allocation of scarce resources, 
prioritisation of goals, and attainment of security are to be affected. However, old assumptions 
that citizens’ loyalty to their state of residence could be broadly taken for granted are 
increasingly challenged by new political spaces of governance. The opportunities offered by 
multi-media communication lead to an environment in which mediated governance challenges 
the idea of rational two-way communication among those who exercise political power and 
those subject to it. Neither political authority nor the public is coherent and cohesive, integrated 
or common if not uniform. That they are not is recognised by the Commission and member 
governments in their attempts (such as the Convention on the Future of Europe and the post-
Constitution referenda) to bring citizens to discuss the organisation and allocation of power 
among EU institutions in a defined geopolitical space. The idea is that in doing so citizens may 
begin to re-think of themselves as citizens communicating in a non-nation state, a supranational 
space of common values centred arround the four freedoms: liberty, the rule of law, justice and 
security.  
The EU exercise in communication therefore does not illustrate how citizens influence the shape 
and priorities on the agenda. Instead, it shows how deploying ICT can facilitate interaction over 
a pre-determined set of core values connected to pre-selected political priorities that crucially 
depend on sustainable security. Realising e-governance 2020 highlights this, but ducks the 
critical discussion over legitimising policy goals and means that many citizens find 
disproportionate and unacceptable. This is especially clear in respect to the introduction of 
biometric data and identity cards (or their shadows) for which no legal basis exists in the treaties 
and over which there has not been public debate in the European or national parliaments. 
                                                      
3 DG Communication, (2005), Action Plan to improve communicating Europe by the Commission, July 2005; DG 
Communication, Action plan - annex with 50 measures. 
4 N. Scandamis, (2006), Normative parameters of exceptionalism: Community governance patterns in the field of 
security and its implications for a future global governance as responding to the internal rules of globalization, 
existing or to be, paper for Challenge, University of Athens, January.; Anheier H., M. J. Kaldor & M Glasius (eds) 
(2005), Global Civil Society 2005/6, London: Sage.; Hoffman J. (2004), Citizenship beyond the State, London: Sage.; 
James P. (2004), Globalization and Violence, London: Sage.; Grant, David, Cynthia Hardy, Cliff Oswick & Linda 
Putnam (eds) (2004), The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Discourse, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. COMMUNICATING (IN)SECURITY: A FAILURE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY? | 3 
 
There is a tendency to conflate information-giving with communication. The former is passive 
and associated with making information available (the claims of transparency). From the 
Commission’s point of view, this has to be presented in as politically neutral a manner as 
possible to avoid treading on the toes of governments. Such a passive communication strategy is 
essentially problematic because it avoids deliberation and cannot capitalise on the emerging 
non-territorial clusters expressing socio-political interests and values that both transcend and 
continue to find some expression in the more traditional tensions between political parties and 
groups within member states. Moreover, a passive communication strategy is especially 
problematic in relation to ‘security’ because of the imprecision of what security means, and the 
cultures of secrecy that surrounds international diplomacy as well as internal security. These 
underlying factors contribute to the difficulties of communicating clearly about security in the 
EU. Such passive communication becomes a vehicle that provides access to some information 
for citizens to find out about the goals of their political masters. The objective of all players in 
this situation is not necessarily informed discourse. Rather it is about persuasion. While 
mediatisation may blur the boundaries between space and dimensions of space, the legitimacy 
of the information source in such a setting is vital to promoting understanding and distilling 
consensus over both the legitimacy of the rulers to rule and the justness of the particular issue 
on which they have pronounced. When parliaments were seen to hold executives democratically 
accountable, there was an understood ultimate locus of political contestation, polarisation and 
advocacy, and an ultimate source of political authority and democratic legitimacy. This concept 
is increasingly challenged. 
Interestingly during the EU presidencies of Austria to Finland, national parliaments have held 
parallel responsibility for coordinating common national parliamentary activities, such as input 
reflecting the draft Constitution. Ensuring that their voice is broadcast, heard and heeded is 
more complicated. Persuasion in cyber-space sans frontiers without traditional political 
interlocutors – the national political classes and MPs – is problematic. The authoritative 
mediators of public opinion – MPs themselves – are as insufficiently engaged either with the 
civil society networks or with the supranational institutional framework where they might be 
expected to play a role in shaping outcomes and making themselves heard. The EU’s guidelines 
on strengthened partnerships with national parliaments
5 endorsed by the June 2006 European 
Council gives MPs a right to receive draft Commission proposals directly and comment on them 
(in a manner akin to the old non-elected European Parliament) but without a guarantee that they 
will be influential and without an effective mechanism to coordinate a common view. 
The task of persuasion is all the more onerous if one goes beyond the immediate problems 
associated with communicating Europe to the more specific and more contentious realm of 
communicating EU security. This is already seriously hedged by rules on secrecy and 
exceptionalism. Secrecy can be seen as a derogation from transparency. Not surprisingly, the 
European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs challenges any 
steps that do not explicitly provide for proper accountability to the EP. In September 2006, it 
accordingly pressed for the mandate of the Fundamental Rights Agency, the successor to the 
European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, to be extended to integrate 
cooperation on policing, justice, immigration and counter-terrorism – all slippery areas where 
transparency and parliamentary accountability have been non-existent, weak or problematic.
6  
                                                      
5 “Guidelines on Strengthened Partnership with National Parliaments”, 5 May 2006, Rapid press release IP/06/1172, 
Brussels, 11 September 2006. 
6 Gál Kinga (2005), Draft Report on the proposal for a Council Regulation establishing a European Union Agency 
for Fundamental Rights, (COM(2005)0280-C6-0288/2005-2005/0124(CNS). 4 | JULIET LODGE 
 
The European Data Protection Advisor Peter Hustinx sees openness and accountability as 
intrinsic to transparency. If practiced responsibly, it is more likely that a culture of transparency 
– expressed in terms of figures and facts, and norms and values – will be developed even though 
freedom of information rules vary across the EU. Transparent information presented by 
agencies lacking trust or of dubious provenance cannot contribute to improving understanding 
and knowledge about an issue, which is one of the key purposes of transparency for 
accountability. Transparency cannot contribute to a culture of trust if it is not accompanied by 
clarity over purposes, processes, methods, strategies and political goals, and by the means to 
implement and crucially challenge them. Nor can it be built when there is concern that the 
agenda is driven not by informed governments and parliaments but by private non-state 
interests.
7 Both transparency and accountability are needed to contribute to the process of 
reducing the public distrust that accompanies secrecy and opacity by government bodies, and 
the concern over the new tools for enhancing public security that governments claim result from 
the application of ICT managed by and outsourced to barely visible, let alone politically 
accountable, private agencies in cyber-space or outside the territorial jurisdiction of state 
agencies. 
In the EU, problems of trust are compounded by institutional complexity that compromises 
openness and accountability. The resultant unpropitious environment for communicating 
security – what it means, how it is to be enforced, and how it is to be controlled – aggravates 
public distrust in government and the agencies of security and law enforcement from the police 
to migration controls. This is all the more problematic in view of the increasing advocacy of 
using biometrics (which are often poorly explained and presented) in civil applications rather 
than merely in respect to crime-busting, or in Eurodac to monitor and control migration. 
Operationally rational reasons for lowering the age for and taking fingerprints of all persons 
seeking entry to (and not just asylum in) the EU from states for whom visas are required are 
also poorly explained, but more easily justified in simplistic terms. It is not surprising that in the 
public mind, the use of biometrics for controlling ‘them’ – the out-group – is seen as less 
threatening to personal liberty than is their application to ‘us’ – the in-group.
8  
There is continuing contestation over the ultimate locus of authority and legitimacy in the EU 
(exemplified by the continuing wrangling over the Constitution) and transparency under pillar 
III. This is exemplified by national parliaments’ confusion and highly disparate roles in respect 
to supervision under subsidiarity rules. All intensify the sense of public disconnection from both 
national and EU agents of political authority. This complicates the communication of security 
and is exacerbated by both institutional complexity and a failure in public diplomacy to specify 
more concretely what security means to the state and to the individual, how it is to be attained 
domestically, and how and why certain measures enable the state to perform its traditional role 
vis-à-vis its citizens in terms of ensuring their security as best it may. The erosion and 
permeability of the old differentiation between internal and external security inevitably adds 
further confusion and complexity.  
                                                      
7 Hayes B. (2006), Big Brother: The EU’s Security Research Programme, The Transnational Institute, Amsterdam, 
(retrieved from www.tni.org).; Ashbourn J. (2006), Societal Implications of the Wide Scale Introduction of 
Biometrics and Identity Management, Background Paper for the EuroSci Fourm (ESOF), Munich.  
8 Lodge J. (2003), “Transparency and EU Governance: Balancing Openness with Security”, Journal of Contemporary 
European Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 95-118.; Lodge J. (2002), “Sustaining Freedom, Security and Justice – From 
Terrorism to Immigration”, Liverpool Law Review, Vol. 24, No. 1-2, pp. 41-71. COMMUNICATING (IN)SECURITY: A FAILURE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY? | 5 
 
1.2.  Disconnection and institutional complexity 
The communication of internal security has two core but inter-linked elements: securitisation 
and function creep. Communicating security to citizens through multi-media, multiple-channel 
ports provides diverse means for transmitting information and equally diverse messages as it is 
enmeshed and communicated via the agendas of data protection, civil liberties and human rights 
(including the vast migration, asylum and refugee agenda).
9 The multiplicity of bodies involved 
in security matters – from agenda-setting through legislating implementation measures to 
operational intelligence, policing and judicial enforcement – means that it is very hard to 
prioritise and discern if there is a single security message, and if so what single message on 
security should or could be communicated to the EU public. This leaves too much scope for 
dominant vested interests to capture and skew the agenda and the communication of security. 
A number of factors contribute to this. Where communicating security in general, and 
specifically within the constraints of pillars II (CFSDP) and III (Justice and Home Affairs) is 
concerned, they include i) the event-driven – and often crisis-scenario – nature of EU member 
state responses to security issues ranging from terrorism to immigration and border controls to 
function creep via biometric IDs introduced ostensibly for security purposes,
10 ii) institutional 
complexity, multi-agency interests and inter-governmentalism inherent to the constitutional 
design of pillars II and III; iii) a tendency for national interpretations of security issues to 
predominate over EU solutions arising from inter-governmentalism and very limited EU 
resources for security issues; iv) inter-agency disinclination to trust counterparts, share 
information and collaborate; and v) the adoption of a mix of EU-based tools alongside parallel 
and sometimes mutually contradictory national or international tools. If the Fundamental Rights 
Agency is able from 2007 to complement the work of the Council of Europe and coordinate 
some of the activities of national human rights bodies, this will be a small step in the right 
direction. Yet, even if there is closer insistence on and adherence to human rights among new or 
candidate EU members and those linked to the EU through stabilisation and association 
agreements, making this a practical reality will continue to be problematic and protracted, even 
with strong political endorsement and follow-up from the European Council and member 
governments. The more e-security and e-governance initiatives are rolled out, the more difficult 
it may be for all to be included as front-and back-end technology are out of kilter in different 
states. Information-sharing among law enforcement agencies even within the EU and the 
Schengen group suffers from this as well as from the problems of incompatibilities and distrust. 
This was exemplified in September 2006 by the Visegrad Four’s disappointment at the 
postponement of their entry to Schengen until 2008, ostensibly for technical reasons over 
Schengen II. 
Moreover, at the operational level, member states’ internal domestic institutional arrangements 
and agencies may find it hard or inconvenient to accommodate EU measures in their routine 
implementation of measures to uphold law, order, justice, security and liberty. Function creep 
and disparate interpretations of the legitimacy and practice of public data re-use
11 mean that the 
                                                      
9Hustinx P. (2004), European Data Protection Supervisor Annual Report 2004, (retrieved from 
http://www.edps.eu.int/publications/annual_report/2004/Annual_Report_2004_EN.pdf); EURODAC (2005), 
eGovernment Observatory EURODAC confirmed as a key asylum management tool for the EU, (retrieved from 
http://europa.eu.int/idabc/en/document/4385/5860). 
10 House of Lords European Communities Committee (1999), Fingerprinting illegal immigrants: Extending the 
Eurodac Convention, Tenth Report, Session 1998-1999, (retrieved from 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199899/ldselect/ldeucom/69/6901.htm). 
11 EU Directive 2003/98/EC on the Re-use of Public Sector Information of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 17 November 2003, Official Journal L345, 22/06/2001, p. 90. 6 | JULIET LODGE 
 
political and operational agencies have to adapt to ad hoc crises and work in a fluid environment 
where borders and jurisdictions are ever-more flexible and eroding. 
Heightened concerns over combating international crime and illegal immigration underscore the 
need for collaboration. However, moving from the rhetoric to the realities of collaboration is 
difficult. At the EU level, inter-governmentalism facilitates procrastination in decision-making 
and implementing steps on a consistent, uniform basis. It may be the only way to speed up a 
common position or responses to new threats. However, it results in new instruments and 
structures being glued onto or put alongside the existing acquis yet outside supranational 
accountability rules. While justifiable in times of crisis or emergency, function creep begs 
questions once normalised across increasingly securitised domestic policy areas.  
Institutional complexity complicates thinking about security in a Europeanised setting, let alone 
scrutinising and communicating security within and outside the EU setting. From the EU 
Council Presidencies, the High Representative and diplomatic missions, special Commission 
task forces, member government ministers and supranational and national parliaments to local 
judicial, border, security and police forces, there is ample scope for variation of emphasis, 
linguistic nuance and the sensitivities of traditional alliance loyalties to intervene in ways that 
may create the impression of a degree of diversity. This can be exploited by domestic, civil 
society and external players.  
In addition to these constraints are those relating to the relative and discretionary competence of 
the European Parliament and national parliaments to scrutinise ‘security’ policies. Under the 
inter-governmental arrangements of pillars II and III, national parliaments might be expected to 
play a role. However, traditionally they are excluded from adequately scrutinising national 
executive action in areas subject to exceptionalism on grounds of public security. This 
originated historically in relation to secrecy requirements under foreign diplomacy and defence. 
In the EU, the European Parliament continues successfully to fight for greater legislative 
authority, but incremental increases have not kept pace with the fast-expanding agenda of 
internal and external ‘security’. Neither the European nor national parliaments have legal 
instruments to oblige the Commission or Council to disclose information or to consult them 
before decisions are implemented.
12 The new Constitution would have improved this situation. 
Similarly, judicial control differs over both policy pillars. The Court of Justice may interpret 
conventions and resolve disputes between member states where this is expressly provided for in 
the treaties.  
An added layer of obscurity arises from the multiplicity of complex programmes and 
cooperation arrangements.
13 Groups within the EU also work together on internal security 
matters, as in the G6 (UK, Germany, France, Italy, Spain and Poland) Heiligendamm March 
2006 meeting of the Ministers of the Interior. They too take decisions that may shape EU 
thinking, but these meetings are not routinely presented to parliaments and receive little 
publicity in many member states.
14 Yet their discussions on the tensions between data protection 
and cooperation in police and law enforcement matters are pertinent and a matter of public 
interest. The European Parliament’s LIBE Committee in 2006 tried to insist on safeguards and 
                                                      
12 Monar, J. (1995), “Democratic Control of Justice and Home Affairs: The European Parliament and the National 
Parliaments”, in R. Bieber & J. Monar (eds), Justice and Home Affairs in the European Union. The Development of 
the Third Pillar, Brussels: European Interuniversity Press, pp. 243-257.  
13 Apap, J. & Carrera, S (2003), Progress and Obstacles in the Area of Justice & Home Affairs in an Enlarging 
Europe, CEPS Working Document No. 194, p. 6. 
14 Behind Closed Doors: the meeting of the G6 Interior Ministers at Heiligendamm, European Union Committee 40
th 
Report of Session 2005-2006. (retrieved from 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldselect/ldeucom/221/22102.htm). COMMUNICATING (IN)SECURITY: A FAILURE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY? | 7 
 
not just on the principles of proportionality and necessity as criteria for establishing whether the 
processing (and exchange) of personal data are legitimate, but also on the protection of sensitive 
information such as biometric and DNA data. Crucially, MEPs wanted consistency between the 
data protection rules applicable to Europol, Eurojust and the Customs Information System 
(exempted from the proposal because they have their own systems) and those of the Framework 
Decision.
15 Such procedural discrepancies are magnified by institutional complexities, and weak 
accountability and transparency. 
This is illustrated by the growth in the establishment of new bodies, such as Commission task 
forces. The Immigration Task Force first met in September 2006. Coordinated by JHA 
Commissioner Franco Frattini, its deliberations range across supranational and inter-
governmental issues. Its advocacy of new steps to improve EU responses to migration problems, 
in non-EU states bordering or close to EU frontiers, through the provision of local aid covers 
numerous sensitive policy areas. Priorities will have to be set if the intended Commission 
Communication for the December 2006 European Council is to be coherent and workable. 
Within the EU itself, numerous committees and working groups prepare work done by 
COREPER. The system of comitology is opaque. Member governments and/or the EU have set 
up a whole series of non-community agencies, which are loosely entwined in European 
integration. Different working groups, committees and agencies dealing with similar issues 
deliberate separately with different reporting mechanisms. The need for effective coordination 
may be obvious but making it happen is tortuous. Problems in e-governance for routine 
domestic service delivery are compounded by endemic weak coordination within national 
administrations
16 and more so in relation to security. Most security-related non-Community 
agencies, such as the European Defence Agency (CFSP) and Europol or Eurojust (JHA), were 
set up in secret, thereby adding to the institutional and legal obscurity of the activities they 
undertake.
17 These practices underscore the lack of accountability present in these pillars. 
Institutional complexity within the EU itself compounds problems of liaison, opacity, confusion 
and weak communication. 
For citizens, it can be difficult to verify reliably at which level decisions are made, and at times, 
this suits governments when adopting measures that they know are unpalatable domestically. 
This puts a greater onus on MEPs to augment their authority at the supranational level and to 
complement it with much closer cooperation with (sometimes recalcitrant) national parliaments. 
Even when pressure to require accountability to parliaments sometimes pays off, the situation 
can still be complicated. In the case of the European Drugs Monitoring Centre in Lisbon, MEPs 
eventually got membership of the EMCDDA Bureau: a step in the right direction but still far 
short of mandatory parliamentary accountability. Given that this body also has a cooperation 
agreement with Interpol on police collaboration, and takes operational initiatives with 
implications for public policy in the EU, this is not entirely satisfactory. Similarly, initiatives on 
matters relating to critical infrastructure encroach domestic employment policies and practices 
(as in the recruitment of maritime and other transport workers) where some states, both inside 
                                                      
15 EP:Decision on the committee responsible, 1
st reading/single reading, CNS/2005/0202:15/5/2006 (available on the 
European Parliament Legislative Observatory). 
16 Modinis Progress Report (2006), Breaking Barriers to eGovernment, August 2006, (retrieved from 
www.egovbarriers.org). 
17 Den Boer, M. (2004), “The European Convention and its Implications for Justice and Home Affairs Cooperation”, 
in Apap, J. (ed), Justice and Home Affairs in the EU: Liberty and Security Issues after Enlargement, Chelthenham: 
Edgar Elgar. 8 | JULIET LODGE 
 
and outside the EU, may check the legal status of workers against immigration and other 
databases, as is the case in the US.
18 
It is important to recognise that whereas member governments (and certainly several 
presidencies since Tampere) seem to have a JHA vision and plans, and while the Commission 
openly and quietly communicates what initiatives are intended, their implementation may 
deviate significantly from the ideals and contemporary expectations of parliamentary 
accountability and legitimacy procedures. Soft instruments of security and soft law mechanisms 
flourish; voluntarism and framework regulations occupy the spaces where constitutional 
accountability is evaded, weak or barely existent. The disingenuous claims of enhanced 
accountability to individuals through the medium of e-participation (notwithstanding the 
criticisms of democratic inequity, digi-divides and non-inclusion
19) do not disguise the absence 
of effective political accountability and judicial scrutiny, review and legal certainty. 
Heterogeneous legal frameworks with different requirements and variable rules on transparency 
and freedom of information persist alongside a growth in disparate codes of practice not subject 
to parliamentary scrutiny and control.
20 
All in practice weaken the claim that public accountability should be demonstrated through 
representative, elected parliaments. Transparency, open disclosure of information, 
organisational audits and public reporting are not sufficient substitutes for accountability. They 
may be elements of political, constitutional and legal accountability, but democratic 
accountability relies on the existence of the open forum of parliaments to legitimate and 
challenge political authority and prevent the abuse of power by ensuring that ultimate decisions 
have to be explained, justified, confronted, judged and debated openly. In the security field, the 
plethora of forums and arrangements masquerading as guarantees of good governance (such as 
peer reviews, audit trails, ‘transparency’ disclosures, reports to parliaments and oversight 
bodies) results in too many disparate procedures. Interconnected agencies are subject to 
different rules and oversight. While it may be weakly protested that this is better than nothing, it 
ultimately does democracy and the principles of constitutional accountability on which it rests a 
disservice. It does not help to overcome the democratic accountability deficits in the 
increasingly slippery security domain where disconnection and murky messages may ultimately 
weaken the sustainability of the democratic polities and territorial political spaces enhanced 
security policy is supposed to boost. 
1.3.  Disconnection and mixed messages: Biometric insecurity 
Transparency is a much vaunted goal of government and commercial bodies. Transparency is a 
precondition of credible communication. In the EU and member states, there is a mismatch 
between this goal and the set of principles and procedures used to realise internal security 
objectives. This is a source of inadvertent confusion, ambiguity, distrust and disconnection. It 
can be illustrated by reference to the introduction and justification used to deploy biometric 
identifiers for state security purposes and prevent fraud. The tool of biometrics has been poorly 
communicated with the result that the spectre of ‘big brother’ can be inferred from steps to 
                                                      
18Security Document World Press Release, 6 April 2006, (retrieved from 
http://www.securitydocumentworld.com/public/news.cfm?&m1=c_11&m2=e_0&m3=e_0&m4=e_0&subItemID=48
5#). 
19 Information, Communication & Society, special issue on Disability, Identity and Interdependence, 9(3)2006. 
20 Council of Europe (2005), National Laws: Implementing the Data Protection Convention, August, (retrieved from 
http://www.coe.int); Kranenborg, H. &W. Voermans (2005), Access to Information in the European Union. A 
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enhance the capacity of existing JHA instruments to contribute to combating international 
organised crime and thereby enhance EU security. Trafficking in children and illegal migration, 
(several migrants allegedly claiming welfare benefits for the same child
21) have all provided 
governments with a justification for experimenting with biometrics in a way that leaves open 
the possibility that inter-operability will potentially compromise privacy. 
This is especially true in respect to JHA instruments, such as SIS II, Eurodac
22 and the European 
Automated Fingerprint System (AFIS
23) which involves central data storage and a means for 
member states to compare fingerprints.
24 Under JHA provisions, member governments may act 
on their own initiative. For example, steps can be pioneered to advance cooperation among 
agencies in two or more member states pending EU-level action as envisaged by the Hague 
Action Programme even if delayed because it is sensitive and contentious.
25 Under the Prüm 
Convention, signed by seven member states in 2005, the exchange of fingerprint information 
proceeds on a bilateral basis pending the adoption of an EU instrument. In this instance, the 
Commission envisages instruments to link national DNA databases
26 and to link in fingerprint 
databases as well, something that many member governments condone implicitly and something 
that the Commission would not have commented on publicly unless the majority of 
governments agreed. The Council has discussed at what age a child’s fingerprints may be 
compulsorily taken for EU passports. The decision rests not with parliaments, but with a 
‘comitology’ committee meeting in secret – the so-called ‘Article 6’ Committee. Chaired by the 
Commission, it comprises 25 government representatives. Its output informs discussion within 
Council working parties and any resultant documents are not open to effective parliamentary 
public scrutiny.
27 The line to be taken by the governments is being discussed in Council working 
parties and the documents are secret. 
The problems of weak communication and inadequate accountability are highlighted when 
consideration is given to the purpose of linkage in e-government applications. There is no point 
in linking such repositories, unless they are interrogable and therefore inter-operable and 
accessible by law enforcement authorities with legitimate purposes for seeking access from 
within and across the member states. The principle of availability, supported by the Hague 
Programme, underpins these operational requirements for access. However, there is a lack of 
sufficient clarity over what steps are or would be in place to prevent abuse by corrupt agencies 
                                                      
21 The BBC (retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4773005.stm) reported that the fingerprints of 
migrant children under 5 years old were being taken to combat fraudulent welfare claims. 
22 Convention determining the state responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one of the member 
states of the European Communities, Dublin Convention, OJ C254, 19 August 1997 (retrieved from 
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=EN&numdoc=41997A0819);
Reports that the European Parliament’s Committee on Citizens' Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs 
rejected a proposal from the Council to transfer implementation of the Eurodac system from the Commission to the 
Council. 30 August 2000 (retrieved from http://www.europarl.eu.int/press/sdp/newsrp/en/n000830.htm#3). 
23 Council Regulation (EC) No. 407/2002 of 28 February 2002 laying down certain rules to implement regulation 
(EC) No. 2725/2000 concerning the establishment of ‘Eurodac’ for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective 
application of the Dublin Convention, OJ L62, 05.03.02 (retrieved from http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_062/l_06220020305en00010005.pdf); Commission communication regarding the 
implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No. 2725/2000 ‘Eurodac’, OJ C5, 10.01.03. (retrieved from 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/c_005/c_00520030110en00020002.pdf). 
24 http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l33081.htm 
25 Bigo, D. (2006), “Liberty: whose liberty? The Hague Programme and the Conception of Freedom”, in T. Balzacq 
and S. Carrera (eds), Security versus Freedom?, pp. 35-44. 
26 Balzacq T., D. Bigo, S. Carrera & E. Guild, “The Treaty of Prum and EC Treaty: two competing models for EU 
internal security,” in T. Balzacq and S. Carrera (eds), Security versus Freedom?, pp. 115-136. 
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from states with somewhat weak judiciaries and records of trust. Respect for law and order is 
taken for granted in some of the older EU member states. The attendant communication deficit 
exacerbates a democratic accountability deficit and public cynicism and scepticism over the 
overarching goal. The absence of a common code regulating liability for data misuse and 
damage is also problematic.
28 
Inter-operability and accessibility are crucial to maximise the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
various systems – and especially AFIS, SIS and Eurodac – and their contribution to enhancing 
the member governments’ law enforcement authorities’ capacity to meet and deliver JHA 
goals.
29 By themselves, however, they cannot overcome serious deficiencies arising from 
disparate practices and laws regarding access to national databases on travel documents, 
migration, DNA and fingerprints. The trials of fingerprinting under five years of age in the UK, 
the Swedish plans to fingerprint those under 12, and the German insistence on no fingerprinting 
under 14 undermine attempts to create a level playing field, but may be justifiable in specific 
instances. The EU seeks consistency under the Council Regulation No. 2252/2004 of 13 
December 2004, which, in line with ICAO recommendations, provides for biometric facial 
images and two fingerprints. This cannot come into effect until the Article 6 committee has 
taken its final decision – without parliamentary reference or approval.
30 Even then, while 
fingerprinting of all people 12 and over will be mandatory, national exceptions will be 
permissible and will persist.
31 
Inadequately agreed rules on data storage, mining and inter-operability need to be urgently 
addressed. Similarly, the built-in likelihood of erroneous identifications arising from 
alphanumeric data entered into the system from false documents and technologies that can read 
or block RFID chips without the subject’s knowledge are problematic.
32 A private British 
company – RFI-Smart – launched a compliance-testing service for ICAO-based ePassports and 
Government in August 2006, claiming that in the absence of an international compliance 
standard this would help ensure security, functionality and inter-operability. However, whereas 
there is public acceptance of inter-operability in the sense of member states providing for 
mutual recognition of e-identities, distrust remains vis-à-vis the technology, technical 
capabilities, operational reliability, purposes and goals, administrative practice and political 
purposes with respect to ‘security’.
33 
The Commission acknowledged the desirability of migration and law enforcement agencies
34 to 
have mutual access to these databases, and to overcome disparities in access arrangements, the 
problems arising from delays in transmitting fingerprint data to the central unit, and the high 
                                                      
28 De Terwangne, C. (2004), ‘Accès à l’information et Organisations Internationales: le cas de l’Union Européenne’, 
Ethique publique, revue internationale d’éthique sociale et gouvernementale, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 9-22. 
29 European Commission (2005), Schengen: from SIS to SIS II, MEMO/05/188, 01.06.2005 (retrieved from 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/05/188&format=HTML&aged=0&language=E
N&guiLanguage=en). 
30 Regulation (EC) No. 1683/95. 
31 EU presidency proposal to delegations on setting the minimum age for recording and storing facial images and 
fingerprints in the chip of a passport, Doc 9403/1/06 REV 1 LIMITE, Brussels, 26.06.2006, (retrieved from http:// 
www.statewatch.org/news/2006/jul/9403-rev1-06.pdf); (see also http://www.statewatch.org/news/2006/jul/10540-
06.pdf). 
32 http://www.elektor-electronics.co.uk/Default.aspx?tabid=1&mid=386&ctl=Details&newsletter=1&ItemID=512. 
33 Modinis Progress Report, op. cit. 
34 European Commission (2004), “EURODAC detects 7% of multiple asylum applications during its first year of 
activity”, Press Release IP/04/581, 5 May 2004 (retrieved from http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction. 
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rejection rate owing to the poor quality data.
35 The political sensitivities over a European Border 
Guard and the introduction of such a system are communicated weakly so that in some member 
states the impression of operations by stealth arises. Accountability and transparency being 
deemed to be weak, the risk is that the public will think that the governments and EU have 
something detrimental to individual liberty to hide by bringing forth such measures that they 
justify on the grounds of enhancing security. The lack of clarity over the ultimate source of 
accountability, responsibility and liability for data misuse, malfunction or malevolent intent 
underlies the trust tension and deficit. A lack of candour over what happens to the data erodes 
public trust
36 in the credibility of government claims on security still further. 
National governments may take steps that have potentially contradictory and sub-optimal 
outcomes. For example, when the UK outsources public policy data to private agencies (within 
and outside the UK borders), political accountability is undermined along with the credibility of 
government claims as to the security of that data. The publicly visible guarantee that abuse of 
power (in this case in respect to that data) could be tracked and the authorities held accountable 
has to be vested in parliament. Where parliament is weak, there is a tendency for government 
agencies to rely on codes of practice and personal redress mechanisms that are scarcely visible, 
accessible, transparent or easily used by all citizens.  
Whereas the Swedish government has presented proposals to amend the Swedish Personal Data 
Act to deal with misuse and corruption of an individual’s personal integrity in the event of his 
digi-data being misused, accessed illegitimately or stolen,
37 few states have followed. Instead, 
unfounded claims as to the security of digi-data abound even though RFID cloning of chipped 
passports is simple
38 and even though august parliamentary committees
39 have robustly criticised 
governments for their naiveté and lack of clarity. All this potentially compromises the 
credibility of claims that new policy instruments will enhance individual and collective security. 
The consequences are significant for democratic accountability and transparency of any soft 
measures taken to advance an obviously advantageous inter-operability in their own right within 
national settings. They are equally far-reaching at the supranational level where the Commission 
has mooted the idea of giving the infant European Borders Agency the task of managing large 
IT systems (such as SIS II, Eurodac and AFIS, which have detected multiple asylum 
applications, and presumably any other biometric database whether DNA-derived or not).
40 Its 
lines of accountability and public responsibility are not well known. The European Parliament, 
for instance, lacks a robust function or responsibility over it.
41  
                                                      
35 European Commission (2005), Second annual report to the Council and the European Parliament on the activities 
of the EURODAC Central Unit, Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2005) 839]20, June 2005. 
(retrieved from http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/doc_centre/asylum/identification/doc/sec_2005_839_en.pdf). 
36 Dutton, W.H., G.A. Guerra, D.J. Zizzo & M. Peltu (2005), “The Cybertrust Tension in E-government: Balancing 
Identity, Privacy, Security”, Information Polity 10, pp. 13-23. 
37 On proposals to amend the Swedish Personal Data Act, see 
www.birdandbird.biz/english/publications/articles/Swedish_Personal_Data_Act. 
38 See Home Office (2004), Identity Cards: A Summary of Findings from the Consultation on the Legislation on 
Identity Cards, CM6358, October 
(www.computerweekly.com/Articles/2006/08/07/217503/Digital+passports+can+be+cloned.htm). 
39 House of Commons Science and Technology Committee (2006), “Identity Card Technologies: Scientific Advice, 
Risk and Evidence”, Sixth Report of Session 2005-06 (retrieved from 
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmsctech/1032/103206.htm). 
40 COM (2005) 597, 24.11.2005, pp. 6-10. DNA is not strictly speaking a biometric, but issues of linkage between 
DNA databases are akin to those regarding biometric databases. 
41 EP Public Hearing on ‘Biometrics’, Brussels, 2 March 2004, (retrieved from 
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Attempts to improve national parliament-European Parliament cooperation over scrutinising 
internal security initiatives have been troubled by the national parliaments’ uncertain 
understanding of subsidiarity and jealousy over sharing information and control with their 
natural partner in the game of holding the executive accountable: the European Parliament. The 
Duff-Voggenhuber proposals for parliamentary forums would not just address the draft 
Constitution, but core issues, including security and justice. However, greater pragmatism is 
needed in respect of the reflection period on the Constitution and necessary reform may be some 
time in the making. Institutional complexity, fuzzy accountability and muddied transparency 
remain for the time being. 
Consequently, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the priority remains adopting soft law 
‘instruments’ – whether on a bilateral basis, slipped through without public debate, or whether 
on a supranational basis – without considered presentation to and discussion in the European 
Parliament’s relevant committees. Significant operational advances using ICT may thereby be 
implemented without open, transparent discussion.
42 That is serious in its own right. It is also 
serious in terms of the precedent set for evading parliamentary scrutiny ab initio in this sphere. 
It can be observed that governments and the Commission no longer see the need to invoke an 
‘exception’ to justify such steps. It is taken for granted that they are necessary to enhance 
‘security’ regardless of any contradictory or challenging political or civil society claims.
43 Had 
the draft Constitution been in place, this would not have been quite so easy. National 
parliaments are therefore deeply mistaken in dismissing the European Parliament’s efforts to 
rescue the constitutional core of the institutional reforms in the draft Constitution. 
However, it would be misleading to infer from the existence of weak accountability provisions 
in constitutional and institutional arrangements a desire on the part of the public for them to be 
augmented and entrenched in a new constitutional design. Such an inference would imply a 
greater degree of public knowledge about the actual nature of existing checks and also more 
generalised awareness of what inter-institutional weaknesses exist in relation to enhancing 
public authorities’ ability to improve public security. That is far from the case, as can be 
illustrated by a set of frustrations encountered by EU level agencies concerned with combating 
crime and boosting internal security cooperation. 
In November 2004, at a meeting of the European Parliament's Intergroup on Law Enforcement, 
Organised Crime and Terrorism, the President of the European Confederation of Police 
(EuroCOP) lambasted the member governments’ failure to agree for many months on a new 
Europol director. He accused them of being high on rhetoric and low on delivering results, and 
of making empty promises and failing to address contradictions and problems promoting 
collaboration among the various agencies concerned. For example, the anti-terrorism unit set up 
in Europol after September 11
th, 2001 was closed when member states failed to share 
intelligence, and then reopened after the Madrid bombings. Ratification of the European Arrest 
Warrant proved tortuous and open to challenge. Coordination among law enforcement agencies 
                                                                                                                                                            
asylum applications during its first year of activity [IP/04/581] 05.05.04. See also eGovernment Observatory report 
on EU biometric identification system for asylum seekers, 06.05.04 (retrieved on 
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42 European Commission (2004), The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: assessment of the Tampere programme 
and future orientations - List of the most important instruments adopted, Staff Working Paper, SEC (2004) 680, 
COM(2004) 401, Brussels, 02.06.04. (retrieved from 
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in practice is inordinately complicated: the EU Task Force of Chiefs of Police is not connected 
to any other body. Gijs De Vries, the EU's Counter-Terrorism Coordinator sits with the 
European Council rather than with Europol's anti-terrorism unit. None of this is much 
publicised. So the public may have a general inclination to favour greater collaboration among 
the member states to combat international crime but very little appreciation of what this would 
entail in practice. MEPs, too, are unclear as to the balance to be struck between implementing 
greater collaboration and facilitating parliamentary accountability, transparency and openness. It 
is not surprising, therefore, that Bill Newton Dunn, MEP, advocated the creation of a ‘Euro-
FBI’ yet condemned EU member governments for the gap between the rhetoric and reality: the 
hypocrisy of internal security collaboration.
44 Similarly, concerns arise within member states 
where visa shopping is evident among groups of migrants seeking entry via one state to a 
destination state which, if initially approached, may be inclined to reject them. 
The gap between rhetoric and reality illustrates discrepant and complex institutional 
arrangements and highlights the potential for inefficiency in combating crime on a cross-frontier 
basis. Inter-institutional and intra-institutional hypocrisy and communication deficiencies result 
in and compound the problems of communicating a clear message in the public and wider 
political arenas. 
Institutional complexity and ambiguity make for muddled messages. Multiple differing 
institutional frameworks with different sets of rules complicate and inhibit clear public 
communication. The operational requirements of security in practice depend on minimising 
openness. It is not surprising that disconnection should result. However, this does not excuse 
inadequate communication and weak public diplomacy. If anything, in the face of the public’s 
low knowledge and understanding about the diverse institutions, governments might be 
expected to want to improve public diplomacy and communication. In the security field at least, 
there is reason to suppose that the public would be receptive to the message. Paradoxically, 
there is strong public support for member governments to work more closely together to deal 
with common concerns, such as international conflicts, international crime and illegal 
immigration. However, the very instruments to do that exacerbate public anxiety over the 
trustworthiness of government at all levels. The introduction of biometric tools, in the name of 
enhancing security, is not seen by the public to be either appropriate or proportionate to the task. 
2.  Communicating e-security through biometrics: Clouding the medium 
and the message? 
For some time, the introduction of biometric identifiers in travel documents has been presented 
as a vital tool for sustainable security. The attendant public diplomacy lacked clarity and 
credibility. Biometric identifiers in travel documents were presented as a means to combat 
international crime, but they were not accepted by the public in many states as proportionate 
given their linkage to the collection of additional data for unclear purposes, and given their 
linkage to other policy goals that were both inspired by internal security needs and sometimes 
seemed irrelevant. The lack of clear communication, for example, over biometric identifiers in 
driving licences, health cards, various smart cards, etc., raised concerns as to the overall 
implication of introducing relevant measures under the umbrella of claims-making in respect to 
biometrics.  
In July 2005, the UK Presidency proposed making such identifiers mandatory components of 
identity cards in the EU. This contentious suggestion aggravates public distrust of political and 
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judicial authorities because it is not seen to be proportionate, credible or transparent. Biometric 
identifiers are easily portrayed in the media as transforming the individual into no more than a 
human bar code, which can be infinitely manipulated in secret by ICT that eludes public control. 
While biometrics are no more than a tool of ICT, they are readily conflated in the public eye 
with the idea of ‘big brother’: with applications by invisible authorities having the potential to 
abuse the data entrusted to them for other purposes; or worse that are highly susceptible to 
hacking. The creation of national ID card systems has been criticised as creating a ‘honey pot’ 
target for data thieves and fraudsters.
45 There are significant and legitimate concerns about: 
weak security and/or outsourcing government databases to third states and private companies; 
politicisation of authentication technologies that deter innovation; and the absence of adequate 
or sufficiently good data management regimes in respect to the processing, storage and access to 
personal data.  
Calls for the creation of paradigmatic open data files to enable citizens to see how their data 
may be handled for purposes of judicial cooperation or security have yet to be transformed into 
concrete action.
46 The telecities initiative for a Charter of eRights similarly languishes even 
though strong calls were made for ensuring “the effective recognition and protection of concrete 
and measurable rights of all citizens in the Information and Knowledge Society”.
47 Yet, while a 
distinction between commercial privacy entitlements and official privacy entitlements might be 
seen as a means of preventing either sphere from accessing data held in the other,
48 it is 
disingenuous to think that this is a solution to the entrenched problems of governmental 
function creep in the application and mandatory collection of biometric data regardless of the 
needs for transparency and accountability.  
The issue of the relationship between an individual’s multiple digital identities and appropriate 
controls and respect for data privacy and protection is too often side-stepped or fudged. Instead 
human rights concerns rise up the agenda as the introduction of biometric measures is justified 
by agencies concerned primarily with monitoring migration and combating crime and terrorism. 
Sight is lost of the goals, means and justifications. The risk of this happening rises when in the 
absence of a universal ID card, several are introduced incrementally (as in the UK) for 
ostensibly different purposes, such as access to e-services and socio-economic welfare benefit 
entitlements, local domestic travel, e-commerce, etc. Mounting public incredulity and 
skepticism is matched by criticism from IT industry stakeholders over confusion, a lack of 
clarity, wasted effort and goals outstripping ICT architectural possibilities, and the availability 
of appropriate technologies, as well as criticism from parliaments over bureaucratic politics and 
a lack of public accountability.  
For instance in the UK, the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee in summer 
2006 criticised the government – and especially the isolated Home Office – of 
miscommunication, and a lack of accountability, regarding the scope, practicalities and 
procurement of ID schemes. The government set up the Identity and Passport Service without 
properly considering technical issues of inter-operability. It focused on the use of biometrics 
and the choice of biometric technology before impartial evidence regarding its capacity for 
enhancing the performance of the system had been taken and assessed.
49 The inevitable message 
conveyed to the public is therefore one of at best government incompetence and at worst 
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government concealment. This has been compounded by private industry boasting as to the 
opportunity for profits and growing market potential, notably in the wake of the UK government 
foiling of terrorism in August 2006. For example, the US Department of State awarded a $10 
million contract for multi-modal biometric recognition (face, iris and fingerprints) to 
SecuriMetrics, part of Viisage. Several other states accelerated the introduction of digital and 
chipped biometric e-passports. They vary in terms of data storage capacity (with the US 
favouring the 64k chip), lifespan and cost. In the US, a one-off security tax helped fund their 
issue and in other countries the costs keep rising.
50 The market for RFID chips grew by 104% 
between 2005-2006, spurred by e-passports, contactless payments and personal ID card growth, 
and it is seen to be highly profitable by the industry.
51 
2.1.   Communicating e-security 
The communication of e-security has so far been channelled via anti-terrorism discourses and 
instruments. These include: biometric identifiers and passports; passenger name data retention 
and transfer; telephony transactions; and potentially inter-operable databases remotely and 
anonymously accessing data stored on individuals without the intervention of the individual 
subject. Most have received poor press. The credibility of claims as to their security and 
contribution to maximising state security are disputed because of discrepancies over the choice 
of biometrics and technology, the lack of political consensus, and the lack of political agreement 
over controlling their use, shared applications, supervision, and roll-out.  
The European Council and the Council repeatedly underline the importance of using biometrics 
in databases and travel documents to enhance EU security. Selecting what and how many 
biometric identifiers to use was problematic because of disagreement among vested interests, 
partly owing to problems of reliable authentication and verification, and rapid obsolescence. 
Systems that allow 3-D facial imaging automatically overcome issues of enrolment and 
authentication
52 but ignore civil liberties and consent. Yet, they represent perhaps state-of-the-
art technology. Moreover, governments are proceeding with little regard to EU preferences. The 
UK’s e-borders scheme, for example, not only has requirements for mandatory collection of 
data and biometrics for everyone entering or leaving the country but is also open-ended in its 
commitment to “support general police and criminal justice functions”.
53 The UK National 
Identity Register, DNA-databased ID card plans, for example, appears out of line with EU tests 
of proportionality.
54 
The Prüm Treaty requirement for contracting parties to set up DNA profile databases and wide-
scale exchange of personal data, and cross-border policing
55 sets out intentions and operational 
requirements that several EU member states even now cannot meet for technical and political 
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reasons. Yet borders are being defined as an essential aspect of policing
56 and subject to an 
overall border management strategy covering all border-related threats. The EU Data Supervisor 
condemned as disproportionate several recent steps to enhance database inter-operability and 
accessibility to surveillance authorities. The possibility that pillar I instruments will be accessed 
under pillar III (non-accountable) practices is of special concern as are proposals on the 
exchange of judicial data on criminal convictions for prosecuting crime
57 and facilitating e-
judicial cooperation. In this instance, the consultation rather than co-decision procedure was 
used thereby averting amendments or the need to await for approval from the European 
Parliament, and permitting wide discretion by national governments in maintaining disparate 
domestic rules on the purposes for which data could be released by and to agencies apart from 
those directly concerned in a given criminal judicial process. Significantly, too, the Finnish 
Presidency initiated a discussion on moving aspects of border control, asylum, and visas in full 
or in part for a transitional period to pillar I in order to enhance legitimacy, minimise deficient 
implementation and rectify efficiency deficits. 
In the meantime, the impression remains that the roll-out of ICT-enabled cooperation and 
related measures is out-of-step, haphazard and out-of-balance: several institutions are taking 
parallel and sometimes contradictory steps unilaterally and independently without sufficient 
regard to EU desiderata or actual practice. The danger is that public trust in political institutions 
in general will be further compromised. While EU institutions are aware of these risks, if the 
response is seen as too little too late, it will not help to convince the public to trust either the 
technology or the public authorities at whatever level. Fine-sounding statements of intent lack 
credibility.  
There has been a failure of public diplomacy that has not been adequately compensated by 
flanking measures from the Commission. The Commission tried in 2005 to ensure that 
proportional steps are taken following systematic risk assessments,
58 and to launch discussion on 
the longer-term shape and content of inter-operable IT systems (such as SIS I, II, Eurodac, VIS, 
etc.) in the JHA field before more legislative initiatives are undertaken.
59 Its November 2005 
Communication examined whether the “technical and operational possibilities are proportionate 
and compatible with the need to protect the rights of the individual” and observed that the 
primary role of national governments lay in furthering inter-operability. Such political 
correctness is somewhat disingenuous. ICT advantages are optimisable in non-territorial space. 
Cross-border applications in the EU, therefore, presuppose the easy permeability, if not 
complete irrelevance, of territorial borders. Digi-profiling replaces geographical borders in non-
territorial space.  
Governments portray security as the precondition for sustainable economic development and 
global competitiveness, and accordingly justify introducing surveillance-type measures (such as 
CCTV, tagging, biometric identifiers, etc.) as instruments to enhance their ability to deliver 
                                                      
56 See note from the Finnish Ministry of the Interior to the Informal JHA meeting in Tampere, 20-22 September 2006 
on the Development of an EU Integrated Border Management System for External Borders: Management Strategy, 
appended in the annex. 
57 http://www.statewatch.org/news/2006/aug/01eu-convictions.htm 
58 Communication of 27 April 2005 COM (2005)172 final on the Compatibility of legislative proposals with the 
charter of Fundamental Rights (setting out a methodology for the internal control of fundamental rights, their 
integration in impact assessment depending on the scope of the likely impacts and inclusion of a standard recital on 
the Charter). 
59 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Improved effectiveness, 
enhanced interoperability and synergies among European databases in the area of Justice and Home Affairs (COM 
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security
60 and combat activities that compromise it (such as terrorism, illegal immigration, 
trafficking, hacking, organised crime, etc.).
61 E-security measures, such as PKI authentication 
tools and inter-operable databases, are part of this trend. However, concern that these measures 
are disproportionate is also readily linked to suspicion that the driver is not necessarily security 
but commercial interests seeking economic gain.
62 Herein lies a further source of public 
disconnection and distrust. Elected governments and parliaments do not appear to be in control: 
policy appears not to be initiated by them, but driven by vested private-sector global-player 
interests which seem to elude parliamentary accountability. Voluntary adherence to good codes 
of practice is not trusted as a sufficient guarantee of privacy and e-security even though several 
respected organisations are trying to advance good practice. The credibility gap in relation to the 
feasibility of e-security grows. 
There is an uneasy tension between reconciling the quest for sustainable security, complete with 
increased surveillance and intelligence mining operations (sometimes dubbed the securitisation 
of society) and protection of data privacy and human rights. Balancing the two is difficult. 
Parliaments are the core arena for voicing concerns and ensuring that: the former does not 
proceed at the expense of the latter; ICT advantages are appropriately used; and individuals’ 
fundamental rights are safeguarded, including personal data, as per the European Convention of 
Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
Public diplomacy here is again weak. The messages, from diverse sources, have been mixed and 
have aggravated the very trust deficit that policy-makers claim they are designed to reduce. As a 
result: 
•  The public sees these types of measures as disproportionate; the principle of availability 
is widely misunderstood and mistrusted. 
•  The public is not convinced that EU officials and governments want or are able to 
safeguard individual data privacy and integrity. 
•  The public is concerned that data and identity theft risks are increased by e-security and 
e-governance measures. 
•  The public is not convinced that police, legal and law enforcement systems are 
universally honest across the EU: the fudging of applicant states’ ability to meet EU 
criteria (notably in the JHA realm) does not allay fears that corruption is widespread 
and jeopardises the integrity of individuals and the state that purports to safeguard them. 
                                                      
60 Green Paper on a European programme for critical infrastructure protection? (COM (2005) 576, 17/11/2005). 
This defines prevention as: the range of deliberate, critical tasks and activities necessary to build, sustain, and 
improve the operational capability to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from an incident. Prevention 
involves efforts to identify threats, determine vulnerabilities and identify required resources. Prevention involves 
actions to protect lives and property. It involves applying intelligence and other information to a range of activities 
that may include such countermeasures as deterrence operations; heightened inspections; improved surveillance and 
security operations; investigations to determine the full nature and source of the threat; public health and agricultural 
surveillance and testing processes; immunizations, isolation, or quarantine; and as appropriate specific law 
enforcement operations aimed at deterring, pre-empting, interdicting, or disrupting illegal activity, and apprehending 
potential perpetrators and bringing them to justice. Prevention involves the stopping of an incident before it happens 
with effective processes, guidelines, standards and certification. Seamless interactive systems, and comprehensive 
threat- and vulnerability analysis. Prevention is a continuous process of ongoing actions to reduce exposure to, 
probability of, or potential loss from hazards. (full text retrieved from http://www.europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2005/com2005_0576en01.pdf). 
61 COM (2005) 597, 24.11.2005 
62  http://www.odwyerpr.com/members/0127biometrics.htm; http://www.prwatch.org/node/4409; B. Hayes (supra 
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•  The public is concerned that human rights will be forfeited on the altar of operational 
requirements for success in maintaining ‘security’. 
•  The public fears that function creep will: compromise any quality or ethical codes of 
practice in cross-border transfers of information; that governments will justify 
inadequate controls on grounds of ‘exceptional circumstances’; and that outsourcing 
will not be appropriately regulated or transparent; and national parliaments are not 
believed to be credible guardians of national security interests or of those issues raised 
under JHA. 
2.2. Communicating  e-(in)security 
In many member states, there is a two-dimensional trust deficit: both elements of trust are 
missing. Politically, governments within the EU are not always sufficiently clear and open about 
the extent to which they envisage ICT being used on an inter-operable basis founded on some 
degree of central data storage. Technically, emerging common standards are fragile and 
evermore speedily eclipsed by technological advances. Technical success requires this; political 
acceptability may rest on obfuscation. Opacity endangers both. Practical experience informs 
cooperation more generally and reveals the problems of transition between the political strategic 
goals and the technical and the operational requirements for greater extra-EU and intra-EU 
inter-agency cooperation, notably in the sphere of internal security, policing immigration and 
law enforcement.  
The technical dilemma of e-policing and e-judicial cooperation is complex and multi-faceted, 
but parallels the political dilemmas. Central to overcoming the dilemma lie questions of creating 
the precondition to making judicial cooperation sustainable: trust. From a political perspective 
as well as a technical one, this requires the creation of mutual understanding, flexible systems, 
locally enforceable procedures, secure methods of tracking and tracing on-line actions (and 
auditing them), and ensuring that the procedures and practices comply with local (domestic 
national and EU-level legislative requirements). Just as in politics, the key questions are who, 
when, why, how and where?  
This is not just about rights and obligations, trading, protection, and tracking and tracing 
transactions. It is about the creation of strong, secure authentication and authorisation systems 
that can be used in a context of mutual trust by those committed to a common goal: secure 
judicial cooperation for security. It is about creating applicable, simple technologies that protect 
ownership and control over privacy while fostering secure e-judicial transactions. The problem 
for the EU is that this is not adequately communicated at any level within the member states or 
by the EU itself. Instead, the public faces a sea of communications and advertising claims about 
the alleged benefits of more RFID roll-out. The claims-making and experience are out of 
balance. 
The Council of Europe’s report in 2005 advanced ideas on how Convention 108 (Convention 
for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data) should 
be applied to biometric data.
63 A special Eurobarometer report revealed public concern with 
ensuring that ICT, and especially data protection issues, were adequately regulated and 
controlled in order to protect them against misuse and abuse. In all countries surveyed, a 
majority believed that protecting information about private life from misuse and exploitation is 
                                                      
63 Council of Europe (2005), Progress report on the application of the principles of Convention 108 to the collection 
and processing of biometric data, February 2005, (retrieved from http://www.coe.int/T/E/Legal_affairs/Legal_co-
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‘very important’. The greatest concern was expressed in the Czech Republic (81%), Greece 
(78%) and the UK (77%). Support for using ICT measures to enhance efforts to combat crime in 
general is high: over a third of respondents felt that measures to track cars, for example, should 
only be introduced if strictly regulated.
64 Little linkage is made between abuse between 
commercial and anti-crime applications, however, unless the issue is directly relevant to civic, 
ethnic or minority groups in highly visible but sometimes transient circumstances. 
3.  Communicating internal security 
Communicating internal security issues is intrinsically difficult in view of the fuzzy subject 
matter as to what constitutes internal security and home affairs; and the legitimate (but ever 
more flexibly interpreted) requirements of secrecy
65 (or non-transparency) to combat fraud and 
enhance operational success in addressing one of those elements generically known as 
international crime. The exchange of classified information with international or national 
agencies provokes suspicion especially when third parties are concerned. The EU tried in 
September 2006 to clarify this.
66 
Whereas citizens may applaud domestic efforts to improve law and order
67 (however defined), 
the raft of instruments adopted to augment this through European agencies is neither transparent 
nor trusted. Imprecision is the norm and not merely because legal convergence is elusive. Public 
suspicion of disproportionate tools being deployed to combat imprecise but anxiety-inducing 
goals is typical, and political justification seems increasingly less credible. Communicating 
security therefore is readily distorted.  
Constitutional and institutional weaknesses allow member governments and the EU’s executive 
branch to permit function creep and a progressive securitisation of domestic policy in a way that 
escapes parliamentary accountability and control. The concomitant absence of public 
legitimisation of decisions taken and implemented on the basis of soft law instruments 
contribute to the general public trust deficit in the EU. As in the past when public confidence 
and approval of the EU has been in decline, member governments have left the Commission to 
devise a strategy to reverse the trend. In 2005, following the negative votes on the draft 
Constitution in France and the Netherlands, the Commission expedited its overhaul of its own 
information dissemination and produced a communication strategy: ‘Plan D’. This did not 
address adequately the key constitutional deficiencies, including internal administrative, 
organisational and budgetary constraints,
68 nor did it confront the real weaknesses in 
communicating Europe to citizens within the member states. Equally problematic, it did not 
                                                      
64 Eurobarometer (2005), Social Values, Science and Technology, Special Eurobarometer, June, p. 91. 
65 Commission Decision of 2 August 2006 amending Decision 2001/844/EC, ECSC, Euratom 
(2006/548/EC,Euratom) OJL215/38-43 with annex on common minimum standards for industrial security 
underlining national security agencies’ responsibility for maintaining the security of classified EU information. 
66 Information Note from the General Secretariat of the Council to Delegations on the Exchange of EU Classified 
Information (EUCI) with third countries and organisations, Council of the EU, Brussels, 1260/70 LIMITE, 8 
September 2006. 
67 In December 2005, Eurobarometer reported that for one European citizen out of four, crime is one of the most 
important issues facing their country (24%). In comparison to spring 2005, more people considered terrorism one of 
the two most important issues facing their country. However, this increase is limited to a few countries, and in 
particular those where terrorist attacks or threats took place (UK, NL) and Denmark, despite the absence of attacks or 
real threats (+20 points). In other countries like Germany (4%) or Portugal (1%) and in the new member states (3%) 
terrorism is not an important issue. 
68 European Commission (2006), White Paper on European Communications Policy COM(2006) 35 final, 1 February 
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address sufficiently the real problem of communicating EU policy matters in an authoritative 
and trustworthy way to which citizens could relate directly. As a result, the trust deficit has not 
been tackled head-on. Yet, the trust deficit is the context within which the other steps are taken. 
This is especially problematic given the accelerating pace for introducing and expanding 
securitisation instruments that are justified in terms of operational needs of law enforcement 
authorities. 
The failure to acknowledge core elements of this trust deficit is risky. This is compounded by 
institutional practices that continue to minimise transparency and marginalise the traditional 
visible guardians of the interests of the people: parliaments. The latter fail to perform three of 
their chief functions as i) the grand forum, ii) the voice of the people,  and iii) education and 
communication. This failing is general across the member states. Transparency initiatives that 
disclose the beneficiaries of agricultural funds and regulate lobbying may divert attention from 
the bigger issue of universal co-decision. They do not mask how governments continue to use 
the European Parliament as a secondary scapegoat for either their collective evasion of their 
duty of openness vis-à-vis citizens, or their resistance to the universal co-decision to make pillar 
III subject to open, democratic accountable parliamentary control at the EU level, and national 
parliamentary scrutiny at the level of the member states. 
Pending constitutional reform, there is a need for particular vigilance on the part of MEPs and a 
high degree of detailed knowledge about how soft law instruments are used to expand the remit, 
authority and scope of application of law enforcement agencies. This was exemplified by the 
problems in opening up the Council when it acted in legislative mode, and the insufficiency of 
inter-institutional candour in December 2005 on the proposed directive on data retention.
69 In 
theory, some MEPs are well placed to discover and communicate identifiable deficiencies and 
seek transparent discussion, justification and communication. In practice, civil society 
watchdogs and parliamentarians have to work more closely together in order to discover and 
challenge new steps, where necessary. As a result, MEPs continue a two-pronged process of 
seeking to promote, advance and facilitate transparency and openness on the constitutional 
trajectory. If they fail to do so, the practice of democracy in the EU is endangered and 
undermined in general, and in particular where pillar III and associated internal security 
measures are concerned.  
Public diplomacy weakness is inevitable in a system where inter-governmental practice allows 
governments to use their discretion in setting goals before discussing the means to achieve 
them. The muddled or discretionary communication of security has implications that go beyond 
the crucial matters of civil liberties and respect for human rights. Weakness in communicating 
security may be due to the tendency for transparency criteria to be used as a blanket term to 
justify non-disclosure of information. In times of crisis, this may be legitimate and necessary for 
operational reasons. Traditionally, the blanket exceptionalism applied to security matters meant 
that non-disclosure was the norm. Disclosure in some states on identical issues now is ad hoc, 
inadvertent or entrenched practice. In some states, administrative bureaucratic practices and 
constitutional rules do not require openness and co-decision, perhaps because exceptionalism 
legitimatises non-disclosure and minimal transparency. This is problematic in the EU because of 
the implicit requirements of a uniform administrative culture to inform and communicate 
security matters to EU residents. This is clearly absent. It is problematic too because internal 
and external security cannot be compartmentalised and subject therefore to the traditional caveat 
of a state’s sovereign right to act in complete independence. This is incompatible with being 
part of an ever-integrating EU. 
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3.1. Communicating  security: A problem of management or a problem 
of mediated governance? 
Managing communication at whatever level, but notably at the level of officials and particularly 
vis-à-vis the public domain, raises problems typical of mediated governance. Openness and 
secrecy are not necessarily contradictory since more openness, meaning less obscurity, could 
clarify when and why security is needed. A wide and diverse agenda characteristic of the 
traditional conduct of international diplomacy as well as bureaucratic and agency management 
of the kind and content of information to be put into the public domain have to be taken into 
account to counter facile assumptions about communicating security. They can be broadly 
typified as i) the cultural framework; ii) the organisational framework with its socio-economic-
politico culture of managing competition over resources; and iii) the perceptual framework of 
risk. 
Cultural framework of secrecy and obscurity  
The traditions of secrecy in international diplomacy, crises and interaction are challenged and 
assisted by mediated governance. The concomitant availability of competing information and 
disinformation sources mean that even for small unitary societies, deciding what, to and by 
whom information should be communicated is complex. It is especially so in the multi-layered 
EU grid. Security risks and crises are normally dealt with in a necessarily rather secretive 
manner. This principle is contested when exceptionalism and function creep collide with the 
principles of openness and accountability, de-stabilising the assumed balance between liberty 
and security, and challenging the sufficiency of government communication of security as well 
as the justifiability of ever-increasing exceptionalism and attendant measures that potentially 
limit individual liberty. The communication of security becomes important when public distrust 
in the message metamorphisises into distrust of the agents of government. The problem is all the 
greater at the EU level given the absence of a single EU ultimate locus of political authority, the 
lack of a cohesive, homogeneous European public sphere and civic society, and government 
ambiguity over the relative authority of supranational over national political agents (usually 
expressed in terms of sovereignty and subsidiarity claims).  
Organisational culture 
Communicating information, especially sensitive information, in the security context is a highly 
delicate task. Strategic, tactical and operational requirements mean that timing, wording, the 
medium and the target audiences have to be carefully weighed in order not to jeopardise 
success. This requires knowledge of the agendas as well as the practices and nature of how 
policy circles work at all levels and vis-à-vis operational agencies, such as police and border 
agencies. It depends on careful planning and an ability to make a fair assessment when deciding 
whether certain information should be disclosed or kept confidential. Even then, within 
government departments and media agencies, group think, bureaucratic politics, reliance on sub-
optimal, pre-selected options and a tendency not to re-appraise decisions in light of new 
evidence can inhibit appropriate responses. They can also exacerbate communication 
deficiencies arising from organisational failures at any level that compromise the flow of 
information, including inadequate financial and human resources. JHA funding, for instance, 
though significantly boosted by national funding, officially accounts for no more than 1% of EU 
expenditure. In such a nascent policy area, the organisational culture is far from homogeneous. 
Managing internal security with disparate media, new technology tools, human resources and 
traditions in flexi-territorial spaces as well as in cyber-space challenges governments to rethink 
the whole area.  
The EU is still struggling to create the kind of public ‘loyalty’ that member states take for 
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response, permits diversity and weakens coherent and consistent communication. Sometimes an 
advantage, its inherent disadvantages are problematic if magnified by public distrust and 
scepticism. This is problematic not just for governments touting their sovereign credentials, but 
for the overall credibility of individual and collective claims-making in the security sphere. 
Selecting the tools and means to get the message across is an ill-recognised part of the 
communication problem. The choice affects the content and presentation of policy. These 
include risk and crisis management, agenda and symbolic management, and network and 
process management through to mediated governance.  
Perceptual culture of risk and crisis  
Risk management – identifying and analysing risks and making a selection of policy options 
and recommendations for action – requires a balance between mapping possible threats, 
vulnerabilities and risks and assessing possible benefits, competing values and potential costs.
70 
Risk assessment can be highly subjective, perceptually skewed, culturally captured, subject to 
immense time and financial (and other resource) constraints, and technically and managerially 
complex. Managing risk depends on many criteria including the process of risk selection, 
knowledge of different players’ and stakeholders’ preferences, priorities, strengths, weaknesses, 
proclivity to entertain and evaluate contradictory evidence to one’s chosen options, assessment 
of the reliability and trustworthiness of all concerned. All these criteria become intensely 
compressed in crises where the tendency to remain with the courses of action chosen at the 
outset of a crisis are highest.
71 Within an organisation of any size, transparency of procedure 
even under time constraints may help improve sub-optimal outcomes, provided that it is 
sufficiently open to new inputs.  
A perceptual culture of risk and crisis means that policy and its implementing measures can be 
viewed through a crisis prism in ways that lead to instruments being chosen that the public sees 
as disproportionate or inappropriate. Agenda-setting and management require thorough 
knowledge not just of the political culture of policy and diplomatic circles, but also of the 
media.
72 By exposing steps, the ground can be prepared for often difficult démarches. Symbols 
and rituals from the projection of images to the processes of security management are designed 
to prepare the ground for military or diplomatic action; communicating threats to carefully 
timed releases of committee papers, diplomatic visits, the announcement of unattainable 
positions to fall-back (acceptable optimisable-bargained outcomes) have a role in 
communicating policy intentions and goals, especially where broad-stroke generalised security 
goals are concerned. The more mundane implementing steps are commonly less carefully 
presented and more easily captured and skewed by agencies, industry and sectoral interests 
outside the political domain. Yet, effectively communicating the more mundane aspects of 
security is vital and significant, as experience in the EU shows.  
3.2. Mediating  security 
Trust in the media and trust in the political processes are becoming intertwined. Their mutual 
dependence affects the process, content and credibility of public diplomacy communication. 
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Quality codes of practice and rhetoric cannot cover up sloppy journalism, poor communication, 
failings in public diplomacy or in democratic practice.  
It is hard to depict how the media influence perception of risks and fears and the so-called 
‘culture of fear/unease’. Message content and what users receive relate to the structural design 
and the ethical standards of the media and the psychological and cultural mind-set of its users. 
The dynamics of the televised press conference or interview, with its emphasis on simplistic 
sound bites encourages politicians to be more populist and emotive.
73 Media values and 
structures limit and inhibit how a message is communicated, and so contribute to limiting and 
skewing of information. Politicians and public managers aware of this set out strategies to deal 
with the media; keeping them at bay or seeking out their help depending on the crisis at hand 
and the strategies that have been set up to resolve the situation. As such public knowledge about 
security issues is mediated through pre-determined filters, they may in turn already have been 
filtered by others subject to bureaucratic politics, the constraints of group think, sub-optimal 
decision-making, the socio-psychological, intelligence and organisational dynamics of 
‘rationality’, information overload, pre-selection and perceptual skewing, time, financial, 
political and military pressure and other considerations including how, if and when the media is 
to be used to signal always partial information to the target audience.
74  
The credibility of the source of a message is an important element in establishing and sustaining 
trust. This is a complex arena where foreign stakeholders and media barons with different 
agendas than that of the EU can be powerful screens in filtering and determining media content 
and emphasis. This element is easily overlooked in the communication of Europe and especially 
in communication about open government and security. For the public, finding reliable, 
dependable and on-going alternative sources of information on-line is haphazard and 
unpredictable. Media-based preventive diplomacy
75 is not an alternative to the visible channels 
of democratic decision-making and the authoritative outputs of governments, parliaments and 
their agencies. 
4.  Conclusion: ‘Legitimacy’ – The missing link of EU securitisation  
In the EU, much of the debate about the inadequacy of appropriate democratic accountability 
and responsibility mechanisms has taken place within the discourse of liberty and human and 
civil rights. Accordingly, attention is paid to the impact of deploying security tools (such as data 
storage in centralised and possibly inter-operable databases, biometric identifiers, verification, 
authentication, data privacy, PKI infrastructures, ambient intelligence, RFID and 
communication retention) on civil liberties. The absence of adequate parliamentary controls and 
the voluntary or self-regulation by stakeholders of quality codes of practice jeopardise the 
plausibility of policy-makers’ claims that safeguards are both adequate and sufficient to deliver 
promised security gains and deter security breaches (including identity theft and hacking).  
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The credibility of EU claims is endangered by the fact that most pillar III institutions and 
actions elude EU budgetary control, are predominantly financed by the member governments, 
and because any updating – and expansion of – their mandates is not subject to regular 
justification and authorisation from the European Parliament. Regulatory committees under 
comitology rule. This produces a disjunction between what the member governments and the 
EU publicly say and what the law enforcement and security institutions secretly or openly do. 
The public may well loosely approve of the latter’s intentions, but the disjunction has serious 
consequences for the EU’s credibility as the open, benign servant-of-the-people image that it 
seeks to evoke. 
The problem of communicating security has two main elements: one relates to the politico-
constitutional construct of managing the internal-external security agendas; the other to the lack 
of clarity over the nature and tools for effecting accountable security. The first is exemplified by 
the inter-governmental bargain, which deprives the commons of voice. The second is 
characterised by competing agendas, none of which seems to enjoy the legitimising support of 
an ultimate political authority that is accountable and responsive to the public whose security it 
seeks to ensure. Both contribute to a sense of missing legitimacy in claims that are made in the 
name of freedom, security and justice and steps that are taken to realise and sustain them. 
Disaggregating security tools may help to illuminate what the tools can and cannot do. They are 
not a substitute for policy content but are easily perceived to be just that. This means that if 
security is to be communicated effectively, convincingly and credibly, there needs to be greater 
clarity over the goals themselves, their realisation through specific instruments that are 
demonstrably proportionate and appropriate, and the way in which they are made accountable. 
Without clarity of purpose, objectives, overarching goals and means for attaining them, and 
without effective management of conflicting perception, interests, understanding and 
operational goals, there is a danger that communicating security will be captured by specific 
sectoral interests. The risk is that their built-in tendency to skew the message to their own 
design obscures the overall goals of freedom, security and justice. The communication of 
insecurity rather than security can well result. | 25 
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Annex 
Ministry of the Interior 
Informal JHA Ministerial Meeting 
Tampere, 20-22 September 2006 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE EU’S INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR 
EXTERNAL BORDERS; BORDER MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 
Significant progress has been made in developing an integrated EU border management system. 
Important issues here include: the establishment of Frontex, the External Borders Agency; the 
adoption of the regulation establishing a community code on the rules governing the movement 
of persons across borders (the Schengen Borders Code), the regulation laying down rules on 
local border traffic at the external land borders of the member states, amending the Schengen 
Convention and the Common Consular Instructions.  
To ensure the constant development of EU border management, the Presidency proposes that 
political strategic guidelines, namely the EU border management strategy, be adopted. The 
strategy includes the main definitions concerning integrated border management. It also helps to 
specify the role of the Council, to increase the transparency of border control, to reinforce 
cooperation between national authorities and to deal with initiatives related to the development 
of border management. Moreover, the strategy provides an outline for the conduct of external 
relations in the field of border management. 
Definitions: The Presidency aims to define 'integrated border management' as unambiguously as 
possible. In the Presidency’s view, integrated border management should consist of the 
following dimensions: 
•  border control (checks and surveillance) as defined in the regulation establishing a 
community code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders, 
including the necessary risk analysis and criminal intelligence investigation of cross-
border crime. 
•  a four-tier access control model (measures in third countries, cooperation with 
neighbouring countries, border control and control measures within the area of free 
movement). 
•  cooperation between the authorities in the field of border management at the national 
and international level (border control, customs and police authorities, security services 
and other relevant authorities). 
•  coordination and coherence of action taken by member states and institutions. 
The key principle is that border management must cover all border-related threats. 
Specifying the role of the Council: In the Presidency' view, the Council should play an active 
role in providing political and strategic guidelines. The Council should authorise SCIFA, 
together with representatives of the authorities responsible for integrated border management to 
continue its work in this field. This work must be carried out in such a way as to support the on-
going work of Frontex and other institutions with due regard to the workload arising from 
previous obligations. 
Increasing the transparency of border management: The trust and confidence of citizens in the 
European Union increasingly requires successful border management. In the Council’s view, COMMUNICATING (IN)SECURITY: A FAILURE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY? | 31 
 
border management policy must be implemented at all external borders in a more transparent 
manner, both between the member states and towards relevant institutions. This will require the 
development of common risk analysis and evaluation methods. 
Cooperation between national authorities: criminal intelligence, implemented in cooperation 
between the Border Guard, customs, police, and the national security services is the 
recommended practice according to the Schengen Evaluation Committees. The Presidency 
proposes this model as a form of ‘best practice’. 
The external dimension: border management is visible with the external relations of the EU in 
many ways. It is then appropriate to adopt guidelines, where appropriate, and to guide EU 
support projects and contacts with cooperation partners with a EU perspective. All of the states 
in the Western Balkans have been given a perspective of future membership to the European 
Union. It is important to retain the requirements of specialisation and professionalism, although 
the creation of too large an administrative capacity should also be avoided. Regional flexibility 
measures should be introduced. 
No exceptions can naturally be allowed in the case of binding provisions, such as the regulation 
establishing a community code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders. 
The countries participating in the accession process should immediately engage in extensive 
cooperation with the EU and its member states. The immediate requirements should include, 
inter alia, efficient control of illegal exits from a candidate country to a member state and 
effective returns. This should be made part of all contacts with EU candidate countries. The 
Council recommends that the member states and the institutions support permanent professional 
contacts across the external borders of the Union. The principle of a  gradual build-up of 
professionalism may be used in various projects implemented in third countries (countries 
without a member state perspective). 
Initiatives related to the further development of the border management system: with regard to 
joint operations, it is necessary to discuss national resources and the criteria for funding and to 
support the External Borders Agency, Frontex, by issuing appropriate guidelines. In its 
communications, the Commission stresses the importance of a number of initiatives concerning 
the further development of the integrated border management system. At present, the most 
pressing is the initiative on the powers of the expert teams, which operate under the guidance of 
Frontex in respect to a draft regulation that is already under discussion (the so-called RABIT 
Regulation). 
The Presidency considers it important that swift progress is made in this matter – a simple and 
efficient system is our goal. Issues relating to the resources of joint operations should also be 
settled. Other initiatives to be dealt with here include cooperation in the issuing of visas; the 
establishment of a common entry-exit register of third-country nationals; the creation of a 
common database for travel documents; a study to assess the so-called Trusted Traveller 
Programme; and the development of common access to EU databases. 
In light of the recent events in the Mediterranean region, the Presidency considers it essential to 
develop not only joint EU operations, but also regional cooperation between border authorities. 
The Baltic Sea region has an effective cooperation model in use where all states in the region – 
both EU Member States and Russia – have been cooperating at an operational level for ten years 
now. A similar model has been developed for the Mediterranean in the framework of the 
Medsea project of Frontex. 
The Presidency’s strategy for border management was discussed at the meeting of the Strategic 
Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum (SCIFA) held on 5 July 2006. Based on the 32 | JULIET LODGE 
 
numerous comments received following the meeting, the Presidency drew up a new official 
document, which was discussed at the informal SCIFA meeting on 3-5 September. 
Questions: 
1) The Finnish Presidency aims to reach an agreement on the definition of the integrated border 
management system in a manner that would be appropriate to describe the on-going progress 
and its results. Another aim is to establish clear criteria for the discussion and joint projects 
between candidate countries, third countries and other international partners. Do the member 
states agree on the usefulness and content of the definition? 
2) The Presidency requests comments on whether SCIFA should still be obligated to actively 
monitor the development of the integrated border management system and to discuss the matter, 
where necessary, together with representatives of the authorities responsible for integrated 
border management. 
3) What are the positions of the member states on the policy guidelines, which deal with the 
principles of transparency, cooperation between various authorities and external relations?  
 
About CHALLENGE 
he familiar world of secure communities living within well-defined territories and enjoying all the 
celebrated liberties of civil societies is now seriously in conflict with a profound restructuring of 
political identities and transnational practices of securitisation. CHALLENGE (Changing Landscape 
of European Liberty and Security) is a European Commission-funded project that seeks to facilitate 
a more responsive and responsible assessment of the rules and practices of security. It examines the 
implications of these practices for civil liberties, human rights and social cohesion in an enlarged EU. The 
project analyses the illiberal practices of liberal regimes and challenges their justification on the grounds of 
emergency and necessity. 
The objectives of the CHALLENGE project are to: 
•  understand the convergence of internal and external security and evaluate the changing character of the 
relationship between liberty and security in Europe; 
•  analyse the role of different institutions in charge of security and their current transformations; 
•  facilitate and enhance a new interdisciplinary network of scholars who have been influential in the re-
conceptualising and analysis of many of the theoretical, political, sociological, legal and policy 
implications of new forms of violence and political identity; and 
•  bring together a new interdisciplinary network of scholars in an integrated project, focusing on the state 
of exception as enacted through illiberal practices and forms of resistance to it. 
The CHALLENGE network is composed of 21 universities and research institutes selected from across the 
EU. Their collective efforts are organised under four work headings:  
•  Conceptual – investigating the ways in which the contemporary re-articulation and disaggregation of 
borders imply a dispersal of practices of exceptionalism; analysing the changing relationship between 
new forms of war and defence, new procedures for policing and governance, and new threats to civil 
liberties and social cohesion. 
•  Empirical – mapping the convergence of internal and external security and transnational relations in 
these areas with regard to national life; assessing new vulnerabilities (e.g. the ‘others’ targeted and 
critical infrastructures) and lack of social cohesion (e.g. the perception of other religious groups). 
•  Governance/polity/legality – examining the dangers to liberty in conditions of violence, when the state 
no longer has the last word on the monopoly of the legitimate use of force.  
•  Policy – studying the implications of the dispersal of exceptionalism for the changing relationship 
among government departments concerned with security, justice and home affairs, along with the 
securing of state borders and the policing of foreign interventions. 
The CHALLENGE Observatory 
The purpose of the CHALLENGE Observatory is to track changes in the concept of security and monitor 
the tension between danger and freedom. Its authoritative website maps the different missions and activities 
of the main institutions charged with the role of protection. By following developments in the relations 
between these institutions, it explores the convergence of internal and external security as well as policing 
and military functions. The resulting database is fully accessible to all actors involved in the area of 
freedom, security and justice. For further information or an update on the network’s activities, please visit 
the CHALLENGE website (www.libertysecurity.org). 
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